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THE President's Committee has received a well-deserved accolade of praise
from the civilized, and of brickbats from the blood-fanatics, for its report on
civil rights in America, of which more than a million copies have been re-
printed. So far as I know, however, none of the commentators on this im-
portant document has noted that it is not the first in its field. Some 78 years
before the landing of the Pilgrims, the first comprehensive report on the civil
rights of Americans was completed. In the concluding paragraphs of his
report, dated December 8, 1542, Fra Bartholomew de las Casas expressed
some doubt as to "whether it could be worse to give the Indians into the
charge of the devils of hell than to the Christians of the Indies." Unfortu-
nately the world's mightiest government, in 1542, was not mighty enough
to correct the abuses that Las Casas reported. A number of high-minded
statutes outlawing various current forms of racial discrimination and oppres-
sion were promulgated, but they were not enforced. And because Spain, in
its American dominions, could not assure equal justice to its people, the
lands it ruled were blighted, and its imperial power slowly crumbled into the
dust.
The President's Committee on Civil Rights follows the report of Las Casas
to King Philip in its basic conception that a man has a right to liberty and
to equal justice before the law, not because of his skin color, religion, or
ancestry, but just because he is human. To be human, as both reports recog-
nize, is to have potentialities of achievement and of contribution to the com-
mon good or the glory of God (depending upon one's language), and these
potentialities are poisoned by intolerance. The manifestations of racial and
religious intolerance which both these great documents recount are too clear
to justify skepticism and too vivid to warrant retelling in poorer language.
The documents speak for themselves. The question remains: What do we
who read them do?
When Las Casas made his report, he may have had some doubt as to the
reception that would be accorded by the King of Spain to his devastating
criticism of Spanish lawlessness and racial bigotry in the New World. At any
rate, the preface to his Briefest Report on tfe Destruction of the Indies expressly
recognizes that, since the King can do no wrong, responsibility for the ex-
cesses reported must lie elsewhere:
"As divine Providence has ordained that in this world, for its government,
and for the common utility of the human race, Kingdoms and Countries
should be constituted in which are Kings almost fathers and pastors, (as
Homer calls them), they being consequently the most noble, and most gener-
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ous members of the Republics, there neither is nor can be reasonable doubt as
to the rectitude of their royal hearts. If any defect, wrong, and evil is suffered,
there can be no other cause than that the Kings are ignorant of it; for if such
were manifested to them, they would extirpate them with supreme industry
and watchful diligence.",
A, similar assumption is made by the President's Committee on Civil
Rights. The distinguished members of this committee are unwilling to as-
sume that the President who appointed them, and to whom they report, can
be responsible for the violations of civil rights that their report recounts.
Prime responsibility for these conditions and for their cure is accordingly
ascribed, by what lawyers call an "irrebuttable presumption," to the Con-
gress of the United States, which did not appoint the Committee and which
has few defenders among the readers of such reports. This may or may not
be good politics, but is certainly not good law or good science.
Racial discrimination in the armed forces, for example, is roundly and
justly censured by the President's Committee. 2 "The Marine Corps has
7,798 officers-all white," the Committee reports, with the effective pictorial
representations that make this document almost unique among Government
reports. And after a shocking list of discriminations in the armed forces,
what does the President's Committee do? It recommends "the enactment
by Congress of legislation, followed by appropriate administrative action,
to end immediately all discrimination and segregation based on race, color,
creed, or national origin, in the organization and activities of all branches of
the Armed Services." 3 The fact remains that the President, as Commander-
in-Chief of our armed forces, could abolish such discrimination and segrega-
tion by Executive order tomorrow. Congress has never imposed discrimina-
tion or segregation on the armed services by any statute, and there is no
reason in the world why the President, in whose hands Congress has placed
such matters, should continue to sanction discriminatory practices in the
armed services until Congress gets around to passing legislation on the sub-
ject. Under these circumstances, the Committee's recommendation that
"appropriate administrative action," which is possible now, should follow
legislation, which is neither possible nor necessary, sounds suspiciously like a
bit of election-year buck passing.
The same may be said of discrimination and segregation in the school,
hospital, and recreation systems of the District of Columbia, which rest not
upon any law but upon the decisions of the President and his subordinate
executive officers. Segregation has been abolished in golf courses, tennis
courts, swimming pools and theaters operated in the District of Columbia
by the Department of the Interior, and segregation is insisted upon in similar
facilities operated by the District Commissioners, not because of anything






in the law but because different subordinates of the same President have
different ideas about racism. Segregation in the public institutions of the
Nation's capital could be abolished tomorrow by Executive order or by a
series of letters or telephone calls from the President to various of his subor-
dinates. Yet the President's Committee sends its readers barking up a tree
without possums when it recommends:
"The enactment by Congress of a law stating that discrimination and segrega-
tion, based on race, color, creed, or national origin, in the rendering of all
public services by the national government is contrary to public policy." 4
Does anyone really think that the President is now deterred from abolishing
discrimination in activities of the Federal Government by lack of such a
statement? Would such a statement by Congress today add substantially
to the statement on the question of human equality which Congress made on
July 4, 1776?
So it is with several other subjects on which, after a learned, powerful, and
devastating account of current evils, the Committee ends up with perfectly
irrelevant legal recommendations. Why in the world the President's Com-
mittee should ask Congress to pass a law to eliminate race discrimination
in the Canal Zone,5 when the President himself could do this tomorrow by a
phone call to the Military Governor, has never been explained. There is
certainly no reason for continued military government in Guam and Samoa,
but this again is the result of a Presidential decision, not a Congressional
decision. Only the Committee's irrebuttable presumption that the President
can do no wrong prevents it from noting that, however desirable legislation
on these subjects may be, presidential action under existing law would be
more effective and a great deal faster. Perhaps the Committee was actually
unaware of the scope of Executive power and responsibility in these matters.
Perhaps the Committee merely succumbed to the popular American battle-
cry, "There ought to be a law," which so often blinds us to the possibility or
the importance of enforcing the laws we already have. Perhaps the Commit-
tee was merely being polite in not blaming the President who appointed it
for the evils that it uncovered. Perhaps some of the members of the Com-
mittee really believe that Kings and Presidents can do no wrong. But what-
ever the explanation may be, the Report will send a good many letters to the
wrong address.
The proper address for appeals to eliminate racial discrimination and other
infringements of civil liberties in the armed services or the civil service of the
United States, in the administration of outlying possessions now under mili-
tary government, in the public services of the District of Columbia, or in fed-
eral housing projects or other service activities of the Federal Government
is 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. When action that may be taken in the White
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House to Capitol Hill for legislation on the protection of civil rights will have
both a more limited scope and a greater moral force.
Even in those large fields where Executive action could not by itself wholly
eliminate the evils which the President's Committee reports, there are avail-
able lines of Executive action which would bring us a good deal nearer to the
goals which the Committee so persuasively proclaims. For example, Section
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution expressly de-
clares that when the right to vote is denied (except for commission of a crime)
to any portion of the adult population of any state the representation of that
state in Congress shall be reduced proportionately. If this provision of the
Constitution were enforced, the poll tax states would lose a large part of their
Congressional representation, which is at present sizeable enough to kill most
of the progressive legislation that the President's Committee recommends.
But it is in the President, and in his subordinates in the Census Bureau and
the Department of Commerce, that responsibility for submitting the popu-
lation basis for Congressional reapportionment is vested. And no President
of the United States, apparently, has ever attempted to enforce this provi-
sion of the Fourteenth Amendment. It may very well be that, if the Presi-
dent acted in the manner prescribed by the law of the land, Congress would
refuse to accept the reapportionment he would be bound to formulate. But
at least the first necessary step would have been taken to rectify one of the
most glaring of our violations of the Federal Constitution, and the responsi-
bility for not taking the final step would then be clearly fixed upon Congress-
men unwilling to accept the Constitution as the supreme law of the land.
There is no field of legislation in which racial and religious intolerance has
played a larger-role than in our immigration laws. Anti-Catholic, anti-Se-
mitic, and anti-Oriental prejudices are the dominant forces that have moulded
our immigration laws for some decades. Yet even here there are many forms
of discrimination that are primarily Executive in origin, that could be elim-
inated by Executive action. For example, one of the more subtle but most
basic of our discriminations against Catholic and Jewish immigration is found
in the assumption of our immigration authorities that the early settlers of
America were nearly all Englishmen, as a result of which more than half of
our immigration quotas are now assigned to the British Isles, which do not
use them. This calculation is based largely upon the use of family names as
an index of the national origins of our native-born population. Thus families
bearing the name of Cabot are classified as of British descent, though we
know, as an historical fact, that the original Cabots who first visited our land
hailed from Italy and spelled their family name Caboto. We know, too, that
most other foreign names are Anglicized within three or four generations of
American life. The President and various Cabinet officers of his could admit
to our shores thousands of victims of anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic persecu-
tion by simply correcting the distortions in our current basis of quota alloca-
tions, which are a heritage from days of anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic
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hysteria. An act of Congress specifically authorizes such revision.' But this,
too, has never been enforced.
Of course, there are many other fields where Congressional responsibility
is primary. The recommendations of the President's Committee for strength-
ened civil rights laws,7 anti-lynching legislation,8 fair employment legisla-
tion,9 self-government for the District of Columbia, 10 elimination of racial
discrimination from our naturalization laws 11 and the elimination of segre-
tion in federal-supported institutions (on which the Committee split) 12 are
powerfully presented and thoroughly justified. But these recommendations
would carry greater force if they were not intermingled with evasive "buck
slips" by which presidential responsibilities are covered up with the fiction
that only Congress has the power to remedy our sins against the ideals of
democracy on which this Nation was founded. The fact remains that Con-
gressmen are human, with enough work to keep them busy even if they do
not attempt also to do the President's work. Moreover every Congressman
represents a small section of the United States with sectional prejudices that
he cannot wholly disregard if he wishes to serve long enough to be effective.
Only the President represents all the people of the United States, a people
in which all minorities, added together, total the entire population. Only
the President, therefore, can take the lead in a great campaign to bring the
practices of our Federal Government into line with the ideals that have
made our Nation great and hohored as few nations in history have ever been
honored by the peoples of the world.
The evils which demand remedy have been clearly charted by the Presi-
dent's Committee with respect to the place of the Negro in American life.
Here the Committee was able to build on a vast body of scientific analysis
of the wrongs that are suffered by our colored citizenry and the ways in which
these wrongs tear down the society that inflicts them.
There is considerably less clarity in some of the Committee's references to
other minorities.
The most tragic of our war-time blunders on the civil rights front was the
wholesale arrest, exile, and unconstitutional imprisonment 13 of thousands
of American citizens whose'only offense was to have been born of Japanese
parents. Here for the first time, by executive order, we reverted to the bar-
barity of punishing children for the crimes of their grandfathers and second
cousins. What was done in a war against Japan to persons of Japanese de-







13. Ex pare Endo, 233 U.S. 283 (1944).
1948] 1145
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
scent can be done in a war against Russia or Italy or Spain to persons of
Russian or Italian or Spanish descent. Thus the civil rights of all Americans
have come to hang on international politics. Even the administrators
who carried out our first racial proscriptions and the attorneys who defended
them in the courts have confessed error.14 Yet on this most critical issue of
civil rights the President's Committee does little more than pussyfoot: "The
proposed permanent Commission on Civil Rights and the Joint Congres-
sional Committee might well study this problem.""5 Passing the buck to an
agency that exists is bad enough, but passing the buck to two agencies that
do not exist is the height of a discretion which is not the better part of valor.
The President's Committee gets even further from reality in its brief com-
ments upon the Indian problem. In Arizona and New Mexico, Indians are
not permitted to vote. This is a clear violation of the Fifteenth Amendment,
which forbids racial discrimination in the franchise. Test cases are now pend-
ing in both states to force recognition of the constitutional voting rights of
our Indian citizens. The President's Committee, however, suggests that the
cure for Indian disfranchisement lies in amendments to the state constitu-
tions of Arizona and New Mexico, 6 on which, of course, the Indians would
not vote. One rather expects enemies of federal anti-poll tax legislation, for
example to advance the argument that this is a problem properly dealt with
by state or federal constitutional amendments. It is rather dismaying to find
that line advanced by friends of democracy.
Equally remote from reality is the Committee's comment on the plight
of our Alaskan natives, who, being robbed right and left of their sources of
food and livelihood, are dying of tuberculosis at a rate over 30 times the
national average. Recognizing these facts, the Committee comments: "The
situation is such that federal officials are seriously considering a proposal
made by the Governor of Alaska to appoint a public defender for those
groups." 1 This statement is untrue; a suggestion to this effect was rejected
by the Department of Justice more than a year ago and has not been heard
from since. The Secretary of the Interior was authorized to protect Indian
rights by act of Congress in 1849, but in 1946 Alaskan Indians were advised
by the Secretary of the Interior that they could no longer expect his depart-
ment to render legal assistance in their battles with white canning and mn-
ing interests. Is it likely that a local public defender could resist pressures
to which even Cabinet officers bow? The fact is that one of the leaders in
territorial moves to separate the Alaskan natives from their property is the
14. See SEN. Doc. No. 96, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1943); Note, 11 Gno. WAsH. L.
REv. 482 (1943); Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment, 45 COL .L. ltv.
175 (1945); Rostow, Japanese-American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L. J. 489 (1945);
Rostow, Our Worst Wartime Mistake, 191 HARPER'S MAGAZINE 193 (1945); KoNvrTz, THE
ALIEN AND THE AsIATIc IN AMERIcAN LAW 254-79 (1946).
15. P. 159.
16. P.-161.
17. P. 29; cf. p. 71.
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legal adviser of the Governor of Alaska, the Attorney General of the-Terri-
tory. Comments upon our treatment of the natives who are held practically
as serfs on the Pribilof Islands and denied all the usual rights of citizens, were
discreetly eliminated from the Committee's final report.
Equally inadequate are the Committee's comments upon the problem of
discrimination against the foreign born and their children, a discrimination
which has been carried to its most fantastic eoxtremes in the enlistment poll-
des of the Navy's Intelligence Service, which has generally limited enlist-
ments to third generation Americans.
The deficiencies of the Committee's report outside of the field of Negro
problems are not the result of any lack of human sympathy, but rather a
natural consequence of the prevalent failure to recognize that human intoler-
ance takes many forms. The fact that intolerance towards Catholics orJews
does not ordinarily take the form of lynchings or Jim-Crow cars does not
mean that such intolerance is unimportant. Intolerance towards the Negro
does not express itself in bars to naturalization or immigration, as does in-
tolerance towards the Oriental, nor in expropriation of Negro landholdings,
as does intolerance towards the American Indian, but that does not mean
that intolerance towards the Negro is unimportant. There is much that we
have still to learn about the operation of intolerance, but it seems safe to say
that all of its forms involve the acceptance of a non-human stereotype ap-
plied to a class of human beings. Such stereotypes are fashionable fictions
which save us the trouble of learning to know other human beings as they really
are. In large part they are outward projections of our own basic discomforts
rather than factual descriptions. We say that a man works like a dog, mean-
ing that he works very hard, or that he is as lazy as a dog, meaning that he
doesn't work at all, and in the common speech of the South a member of
the colored race is often substituted for the dog in both similes.This does
not mean that we think lazy people work hard, but only that we accept the
object of the simile as inhuman and thus mean to say that so-and-so is in-
humanly industrious and that somebody else is inhumanly lazy. So, too,
when people say that Jews are communists, in one breath, and, in the next
breath, that they are iternational bankers, that they are "clannish" in
sticking to themselves and that they push into company where they are not
wanted, those who speak in this fashion do not mean really to assert that
communists are bankers or that people who stay among their own kind are
forcing their company on unwilling strangers. What an objective appraiser
of such speech gathers is that the speaker does not like Jews, whether they
are communists or capitalists, and whether they mix with other Jews or with
non-Jews. And when General DeWitt condemned the Nisei with his famous
remark: "The very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturb-
ing and confirming indication that such action will be taken," 11 the substance
18. Quoted by Justice Murphy, dissenting, in Koremnatsu v. United States, 323 US.
214, 241 n. (1944).
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of his statement was that he was afraid of these people whether or not they
had done anything wrong.
We are all irritated at the sight of those we have wronged. That is why we
have Jim-Crow cars and ghettoes and restrictive covenants and segregated
schools and concentration camps for the Nisei of the West Coast but not for
those of Hawaii, who have been comparatively well-treated. That is why
the Supreme Court, after putting a stop to the naturalization of Asiatics, in
1922,19 could so easily, a year later, uphold the anti-Japanese land laws, that
the President's Committee condemns,20 with the bootstrap argument: "It is
obvious that one who is not a citizen and cannot become one lacks an interest
in, and the power to effectually work for the welfare of, the state, and, so
lacking, the state may rightfully deny him the right to own and lease real
estate within its boundaries." 21
The same sense of irritation at the sight of those whom we have wronged
shows itself dramatically in laboratory proportions in our treatment of the
American Indian. Deep in the American conscience is a sense of having
wronged the original possessors of our continent. This twinge of national
conscience may show itself in appropriations for aid to the starving Navajo,
or in other humanitarian efforts. But most deeply it shows itself in a desire
to believe that the Indian is, either physically or culturally, a dying race,
unable to utilize white man's civilization, and therefore an obstacle in the
road to progress. And so we think of the Indian, head bowed on a drooping
horse at "the end of the trail." In the face of that stereotype, the fact that
Indians are today the most rapidly increasing racial group of our population,
trying to exercise rights of local self-government and all other rights of citi-
zenship, and resisting all efforts to "emancipate" them from their reserva-
tion lands or other property, makes little impression. And so, because our
ancestors wronged their ancestors, we can go blithely along legislating the
Indians of Alaska or Nevada out of their lands, timber and fisheries, or abol-
ishing their municipal governments and cooperatives,22 and not even a Presi-
dent's Committee on Civil Rights takes notice of these assaults on the basic
rights of a helpless minority.
It is precisely because the wrongs we commit lead us to hate those we have
19. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922); United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204
(1923).
20. P. 162.
21. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 220 (1923).
22. As this is written a bill (S. 30) to grant lands of the Pyramid Lake Indians to white
squatters at a small fraction of their value, overruling a series of court decisions adjudicat-
ing the land to be the property of the Indians, has passed the Senate unanimously and is
pending in the House; a bill to turn over Indian fisheries to favored corporations (S. 1446,
H.R. 3859), backed by the Secretary of the Interior, has been favorably reported; a bill to
transfer the timber holdings of Alaskan natives to timber companies has been passed by un-
animous consent, Pub. L. No. 385, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 8, 1947); and several bills to




wronged and thus lead us to seek to avoid their sight, it is because these
wrongs lead to chain reactions ending in the destruction of civilization, that
the problems raised by the President's Committee are so vital. Oppression
has not often destroyed the life of the oppressed, but it has always poisoned
that of the oppressor. Vast gaps in the Committee's report which reflect
vast gaps in popular understanding, will be filled by those who come after.
But even if those gaps are far more serious than this reviewer believes them
to be, the Committee will have deserved well of the country it has served.
To have renewed the old American vision of a nation of nations, without
aristocracy of ancestry or creed, is to have revivified our efforts to make that
vision a reality.
FELiX S. Co t
FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CiviL RIGHTS-QUEST FOR A SWORD. By Robert
K. Carr. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1947. Pp. 284. $3.00.
PROFESSOR CARR'S monograph on the federal civil rights laws comes at
a particularly opportune time. The epochal report of the President's Com-
mittee on Civil Rights (Mr. Carr was its executive secretary) has stimulated
nation-wide discussion of the need to secure the fundamental rights of Amer-
icans. Professor Carr's exceedingly useful book furnishes the indispensable
background against which can be evaluated current proposals to strengthen
the Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice and to furnish it with
new statutory weapons.
Within ten years after the Civil War Congress had adopted three consti-
tutional amendments and seven comprehensive statutes to protect the newly-
acquired freedom of the Negro. Yet within an additional twenty years al-
most this entire effort had collapsed, largely because the United States Su-
preme Court refused to approve the program. Professor Carr's analysis of
the debacle, like the rest of his book, is accurate and incisive.
The Supreme Court began its attack on the Reconstruction laws by hold-
ing that the "privileges or immunities" of United States citizens which the
Fourteenth Amendment forbade the states to abridge referred only to privi-
leges of national citizenship and then pumped all the meaning out of that
term by an artificial and limited enumeration of the rights of citizens.1 It
then held that the Federal Government could not punish a lynching mob
because the Fourteenth Amendment was directed only against state action
and not against that of private persons.2 Finally in Plessy v. Ferguson the
t Visiting Lecturer, Yale Law School, City College of New York; Member of the bars of
New York, Washington, D.C. and the U.S. Supreme Court.
1. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1873).
2. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883). This doctrine was reaffirmed in the
better-known Civil Rights Cases, decided the same year, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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court countenanced wide-spread discrimination against the Negro, even
when performed under the authority of the State, by the fiction that segre-
gation did not impute legal inferiority. 3 As a result, the civil rights laws be-
came moribund and were largely neglected until 1939, when Attorney Gen-
eral Murphy by administrative regulation created the Civil Rights Section
of the Department of Justice.
The Section faced almost insuperable difficulties. Of the original seven
civil rights laws, only two remained: 4 18 U.S.C. § 51, forbidding conspiracies
to interfere with federal rights and 18 U.S.C. § 52, punishing deprivation of
federal rights under color of law. Administratively, the Section was but a
gesture, consisting of a half-dozen lawyers and fewer clerks, without regional
offices or independent means of investigation, lacking prestige or power in
the vast apparatus of the Department of Justice and compelled to rely on
the grudging cooperation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local
United States Attorneys. To cap it all, the massive influence of the southern
bloc in the Democratic administration made politically impossible any
forthright attack on the caste structure below the Mason-Dixon Line.5
These factors compelled the Section to limit itself in the main to problems
of peonage and lynching. Professor Carr describes in detail the obstacles in
the path of federal prosecution of lynchers: the FBI, reluctant to cooperate
in investigations lest it "endanger its good relations" with southern police
departments; the animosity of Southern United States attorneys "deeply
enmeshed in local politics"; the difficulty of getting indictments from south-
ern grand juries and the even more formidable task of obtaining convictions
from deeply-prejudiced juries hostile to federal "interference"; the "shock-
ingly inadequate" penalties often imposed by federal judges (indicated by
a $200 fine in an Illinois lynching murder case in which the defendants
pleaded nolo contendere); and finally the dislike of the United States Su-
preme Court for 18 U.S.C. § 52, which a minority of the court described as
"This shapeless and all-embracing statute twhichl can serve as a dangerous
instrument of political intimidation and coercion .... I
It is thus almost miraculous that the Section, even after the decision in
the Screws case, which required the government to prove in lynching cases
a "wilful," i.e,, a purposeful, effort to deprive a person of a specific constitu-
3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
4. In 1894 the federal statutes protecting the Negro's right to vote were repealed, and
in 1909, during the codification of the Criminal Code, other civil rights laws were omitted
from the compilation.
5. It is significant that the greatest legal victories of the Section were achieved in cases
which, at least on their face, had little to do with the protection of the Negro: United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 229 (1941) (prosecution for election frauds of a Louisiana faction opposing
the Huey Long machine); United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944) (election fraud case in
Harlan County, Kentucky); and United States v. Powe, 109 F.2d 147 (1947), cerl. denied,
309 U.S. 679 (1940) (attempt to punish the blackmailers of a Mobile, Alabama, editor).
6. United States v. Screws, 325 U.S. 91, 160 (1945).
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tional right, was able to obtain and uphold the conviction of a Florida con-
stable who drowned a Negro farm hand.7
Yet, despite these genuine difficulties, the record of the Section is a sorry
one. Although it has received since its establishment from 8,000 to 20,000
complaints a year, in no year did it ever initiate more than 76 prosecutions.
In 1943 only 61 prosecutions were begun and in 1944 only 64.8 The Section
has not availed itself of its opportunities to bring or encourage civil actions
to restrain persistent or chronic civil rights violations. It has not utilized
the amicus curiae brief to bring the powerful support of the government to
bear in important private civil rights cases.
During the nine years of the Section's timid and unimaginative life, private
groups have put it to shame I by winning without its help notable court deci-
sions determining basic constitutional principles. Thus, Hague v. CIO,'0 an
injunction suit brought by the Congress of Industrial Organizations under
8 U.S.C. § 43, established that the rights of free speech, press and assembly
are federal civil rights, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Smith v.
Allwright,"l a damage suit brought by the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People under 8 U.S.C. § 31 and 8 U.S.C. § 43 out-
lawed the democratic white primary in Texas, thus making Negro suffrage
effective. The host of cases brought by Jehovah's Witnesses ,- have done
much to strengthen the First Amendment; their most recent victory, Marsh
v. Alabama,13 extended considerably the meaning of state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Similar cases which might be cited are Steele v. Louisville R.R1, 4 Sinel v.
Okalwnma,' 5 and Oyanux v. Califoniia.Y It was even left to a Senate Investi-
gating Committee to discover and publicize the widespread campaign of
intimidation against Negro voters in the Mississippi senatorial primary of
July, 1946.17
7. Crews v. United States, 160 F.2d 746 (1947).
8. Professor Carr ex-plains ihis gap between complaints and prosecutions in part by
the policy of warning rather than prosecuting local officers and by the strategy of encouraging
whenever possible state prosecution of local crimes. The smallness of the staff doe not
explain this gap, because in 1944 the Section requested and vas given the responsibility of
enforcing the criminal sanctions of five labor laws and the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief
Act, because its regular civil rights case load allegedly was not sufficiently large for the exist-
ing staff.
9. Professor Carr cites the National Lawyers Guild, the National Bar.&Asociation and
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, who described the Section
as "lax and weak" and "supine before Southern mores and prejudices."
10. 307U.S.496 (1939).
11. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
12. See Waite, The Debt of Constitutional Law to Jehorahs Witnesses, 28 %Mn;N.L.REv.
209 (1944).
13. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
14. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
15. 68 Sup. Ct. 299 (1948).
16. 68 Sup. Ct. 269 (1948), a case brought by the Japanese-American Citizens League.
17. Report No. 1 of the Special Committee to Inrestigatc Senatorial Campaign Experdi-
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Yet; despite its limitations, the mere existence of the Section is an incalcu-
lable gain in the ever-continuing struggle to make our democracy real. The
presence of the Section serves as a constant reminder that the Bill of Rights
merely curtails federal activity and does not encourage it and that the federal
government must forge and wield a sword to defend the civil liberties of its
citizens. As President Truman has put it: "The extension of civil rights to-
day means, not protection of the people against the Government, but protec-
tion of the people by the Government." 19
That sword is not merely another law. Although 18 U.S.C. §§ 51 and 52
need to be made more precise and the federal rights they protect spelled out
with care, such amendments are no substitute for, or guarantee of, their
effective enforcement. What is needed is a demonstration that the protec-
tion of civil rights will receive as much energy and funds as, for example, the
federal employees loyalty program. The Civil Rights Section, as Professor
Carr indicates, must be transformed into a division of the Department of
Justice, adequately staffed, with regional offices throughout the country,
with the power and the facilities for independent investigations, authorized
to use all of the weapons of the law and not merely the grand jury indictment,
and most important, directed by an attorney general with a burning passion
for full equality in a free society.
WILL MASLOW t
THE LIFE OF RoscoE PouND. By Paul Sayre. Iowa City: College of Law
Committee, State University of Iowa, 1948. Pp. 412. $4.50.
THERE are many different ways of writing any biography; there are many
more ways of writing the biography of a subject so versatile as Roscoe
Pound-botanist, battlefield hunter,1 lawyer, judge, law teacher, law school
dean, law reformer, jurisprudent.
Dr. Sayre's approach is that of an old student who studied law under
Pound when the latter was dean of the Harvard Law School. Moreover,
Dr. Sayre himself became and still is a law teacher and a writer upon juris-
prudence; naturally, therefore, he is chiefly concerned with Pound as teacher,
administrator and jurisprudent. Indeed, he remarks that-aside from the
lures, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1946). No prosecution has yet been brought against the election
officials charged by that committee with flagrant intimidation of Negro voters.
18. Address before the NAACP, Washington, D.C., June 29, 1947.
f Director,- Commission on Law and Social Action, American Jewish Congress.
1. One of the pleasantest features of Dr. Sayre's work is his account of the tramps of
Pound and his friend, Omer F. Henley of Baltimore, over the Civil War battlefields. For
a description of the joys of battlefield hunting see GEORGE MACAuLAY TREVELYAN, Clo,
A Muse in CLIO, A MusE AND OTHER ESSAYS, LITERARY AND PEDESTRIAN 1, 27 (1913).
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contacts of law school days-he talked with Pound only Dnce and that was
during a brief chance encounter in Paris.
My own approach to Pound was quite different. I first met him in 1924
when we were fellow voyagers on the "Berengaria", journeying to London
for the meeting of the American Bar Association; he was, as I recall, in the
smoking room, singing or rather chanting that song of his with the intermina-
ble number of verses-Dives and Lazarus-the life of the party then and
throughout the entire trip. Later I have seen, heard and visited with him at
many meetings of the American and other bar associations, and I even at-
tended some of his classes when my son was one of his students at the Harv-
ard Law School.
I contrast these approaches not to quarrel with Dr. Sayre's method but
to point up the fact that no matter how much one may think one knows of
some of the many facets of "the Dean", one is likely to learn from Dr. Sayre
not only more about these facets but about many others hardly suspected.
Dr. Sayre is not a professional biographer; he makes no attempt to drama-
tize his subject; his style is not brilliant and he is occasionally repetitious.
He has, however, had access to Pound's files, has communicated with many
of Pound's friends, former students and fellow workers, and has himself
studied with an understanding mind Pound's scattered but voluminous
writings.
2
The result is a biography based upon all available material and covering
all phases of Pound's career-a biography which will attract few readers not
already interested in the subject but which will be of absorbing interest to
those who realize they know little and want to know more of Pound, as well
as those who think they know much but really know little.3 Indeed, the
greatest value of Dr. Sayre's biography will probably prove to be as source
material for a more definitive work on Pound's life that will some day be
written. This is true especially in two respects-the author's personal mem-
ories of Pound as a law teacher and the excerpts from letters about Pound
which he has appended to each chapter. The names of the writers of the
letters are not given 4 but apparently they are from Pound's old students,
fellow bar association workers, judges, and many otherswho have felt Pound's
influence. I am not sure but what they constitute the most valuable feature
of the volume, for they enable one to form one's own opinion of Pound, de-
rived from the testimony of a multitude of witnesses.
The factual details that Dr. Sayre gives of Pound's life are as revealing as
the analysis of Pound's legal philosophy or the estimate of his character.
2. Franklyn C. Setaro in 1942 published a bibliography of the writings of Pound
which listed 256 "Books and Major Papers in the Law Alone". Shorter articles, including
those on free masonry and botany, bring the total to 773.
3. Unfortunately there are many inexcusable typographical errors for which Dr.
Sayre is not responsible.
4. Some interesting letters-including an extended correspondence vith Justice
Holmes-are included in the text. The name of the writer of each of these is given.
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Pound was born in Lincoln, Nebraska, in 1870. Lincoln was at that time
almost within sight of the receding frontier; when he was nine years old he
saw the Pawnee Indians marched through the streets of Lincoln on their way
to their new home in the Indian territory. Pound's father, Stephen Pound,
was a graduate of Union College at Schdnectady and had moved to Lincoln
from New York State in 1866; he practiced law at Lincoln before and after
his service first as probate and then as district judge. Stephen Pound was a
respected and trusted member of his community; indeed, he seems to have
been typical of all that was counted best and that was most conservative in
the Lincoln of his day; probably his most nearly radical step was to become
a Republican shortly after the party was organized.
Pound's mother was also a native of New York State; she had attended
Lombard College and continued her studies at the University of Nebraska
when, after her marriage, she came to Lincoln; she taught school both in
New York State and in Nebraska and was noted for her remarkable memory.
Pound received his academic education in Lincoln, at the University of
Nebraska, majoring in botany-the subject in which he later obtained his
M.A. 5 It was with the thought that he would pursue his studies in the sci-
ences that Pound went to Cambridge in the fall of 1889; originally he had
been attracted to Harvard by the fame of Dr. Asa Gray. Gray had died
before Pound's arrival at Cambridge and he concluded that he had had
enough science at Nebraska and, no doubt influenced by the suggestion of
his father, entered the Harvard Law School, where he remained for one year.
Pound practiced law in Lincoln for fifteen years and was between times
a commissioner of the Supreme Court of Nebraska for two years. Neither as
a lawyer nor as a judge does Pound seem to have hit his stride. In a frontier
town like Lincoln the trial of cases was the community drama; the ethics of
the bar were low, as only results counted; consequently Pound came to detest
trial practice. Nor was the work on the Nebraska Supreme Court entirely
congenial. There was little opportunity for the philosophical approach.
Even when the opportunity came the judges were unsympathetic and the
bar hostile. Pound's experiences at the bar and on the bench were a part of
his education-little more.
Pound's heredity and early environment explain many of his characteris-
tics: his photographic memory, his thirst for encyclopedic knowledge, his
scientific approach, his frontier stamina and forthrightness, his understand-
ing of both the bar and the bench.
Probably the most important effect of Pound's heredity and early environ-
ment has been upon his point of view. Dr. Sayre places him a little right of
center; I should place him at center. True, he has been a life-long Republi-
can; but he advocated the federal abolition of child labor-filing a brief in
5. Pound was at one time director of the Botanical Survey of Nebraska and has




Hammer v. Dagenhart 6 and supporting a child labor constitutional amend-
ment; he aided in the confirmation of Brandeis; he disapproved of the con-
viction of Sacco and Vanzetti; he defended Felix Frankfurter when, during
Frankfurter's professorship at the Harvard Law School, he was underattack;
unhesitatingly and consistently Pound has blazed the way for law reform
regardless of the opposition of the conservative members of the bar.
Dr. Sayre does not make out a strong case for Pound in his pre-Harvard
days as either a teacher of law or a law school dean. At Nebraska, North-
western and Chicago, Pound seems to have been more concerned with learn-
ing than with teaching. Indeed, Pound's teaching at these institutions was
merely a part of his preparation; he must be judged by his thirty-seven years
at Harvard.
In appraising Pound's work at Harvard, Dr. Sayre finds that before Pound
began to teach at the law school there had been two periods of the school:
.. . the time of the great text writers and those who were great teachers
through the lecture and text method .... With the case method...
Harvard entered upon a well-recognized second phase of leadership." 7 In
bringing into law school teaching a sociological approach Pound "... . in his
teaching at Harvard and elsewhere and by his influence generally throughout
the world, brought not only a third period to the Harvard Law School, but
in a more sweeping sense than was true of the preceding periods, he brought
this new view to the profession everywhere in this country and other coun-
tries.' 8
Pound's other major contribution to the law school Dr. Sayre finds in the
new teachers he brought in: Manley 0. Hudson, Thomas Reed Powell,
Edmund M. Morgan, Warren A. Seavey and Francis Bohlen.
The only criticism of Pound which Dr. Sayre notices is that Pound has
been unsympathetic with "various devices for smaller classes or for more
intimate relations between instructors and students." 0 In his interesting,
if not entirely pertinent, reply, Dr. Sayre calls no name but may be suspected
of grimacing at a certain law school: "After all, the Harvard Law School has
a magnificent tradition of stimulating instruction on the part of its faculty
and of cooperative search for knowledge on the part of its students ....
Dean Pound did not want to destroy or seriously risk this great trust in the
name of every helter-skelter, untried device that well-intentioned men might
propose for the unconscious purpose of indulging their own laziness or in-
creasing their opportunities for uplift work in legal or political affais at
Washington, . . ." 10
Dr. Sayre discusses at length Pound's philosophy of jurisprudence. Lack
of space does not permit either a synopsis or an extended comment upon this
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discussion. With a consciousness of over-simplification it may be said that
Dr. Sayre finds the essence of Pound's philosophy in his quotation of "the
famous statement of William James . . . 'since all demands conjointly can-
not be satisfied in this poor world' our aim should be 'to satisfy as many as
we can with the least sacrifice of other demands.' " 11 ". . Pound remains
the pragmatist, refusing to say in an ultimate sense whether the individual
emphasis or the social emphasis should always be followed." 12 "His later
writings do not essentially qualify this when they dwell at greater length
upon the development of the law in keeping with the recognized objectives
of civilization at the given time." 13
Dr. Sayre classes Pound's contribution to law reform as his greatest
achievement. This, I think, is a sound view. In our time no other law teacher
or jurisprudent has had so large a following among practicing lawyers and
judges in active service. No award of the American Bar Association Gold
Medal for distinguished service to American jurisprudence has been more
generally approved than that made to Pound in 1940. This was a recogni-
tion not only of the quality but of the quantity of Pound's work. This work
began with an address (dramatically described by John H. Wigmore) before
the American Bar Association in 1906, titled "The Causes of Popular Dis-
satisfaction with the Administration of Justice", and still continues. Pound's
last work has taken many forms-participation in the Cleveland Crime Sur-
vey, in the Restatements of the American Law Institute, membership on
the Hoover Commission, tireless work on American Bar Association commit-
tees, a multitude of articles in law reviews and elsewhere and of addresses
before bar associations and other gatherings.
Dr. Sayre seems to consider Pound's contribution to the Administrative
Procedure Act as his magnum opus of law reform. Here again I am inclined
to agree. Even this, however, may eventually be overshadowed by Pound's
work to better the administration of justice in China-an undertaking in
which, at the age of seventy-seven, he is currently engaged.'
4
It is not difficult to explain the ready acceptance of Pound's views by
lawyers and judges. They have learned Jo trust the accuracy of his factual
statements. He presents his views simply-without any pretense of super-
sophistication or any affectation of weird nomenclature. He is obviously
familiar with the approach of the bar and the methods of the bench. He is
11. P. 343.
12. P. 345.
13. P. 346. Dr. Sayre finds Pound's legal philosophy expressed in four of his books:
SPIRIT OF THE ComiON LAW (1921) (lectures at Dartmouth College, 1921); INTRODUCTION
TO THE PILOSOpHay OF LAW (1922) (Storrs lectures at Yale University, 1921); INTERPRETA-
TIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY (1923) (lectures at Cambridge University, 1922); LAW AND MORALS
(1926) (McNair lectures at the University of North Carolina, 1923). See p. 341.
14. For a progress report see: Pound, Law and Courts in China: Progress in the Adininis-
tration of Justice, 34 A.B.A.J. 273 (1948); The Chinese Constitution was drafted in 1936 and
adopted in December, 1946, to take effect a year later. Cf. Honnoll, The New Chinese Con-
stitution, 23 A.B.A.J. 715 (1937).
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transparently mentally honest, not only personally disinterested but un-
swayed by devotion to any cult. He is never more than a little left of center;
he never attempts to lead a forlorn hope, although he is always in the advance
guard preparing the way for the main assault.
It has been many years since I read it but I seem to remember that Ma-
caulay wrote that the successful man is not he who does the unusual thing
but he who does the usual thing with unusual effectiveness. This almost
describes Pound as a law reformer. He voices for the empiricists of the bar
and bench the changes they would themselves propose if they were ade-
quately informed and entirely uninhibited.
WALTER P. Aim sTRoNG t
DEMocRAcY, THE THRESHOLD OF FREEDOM. By Harold F. Gosnell. New
York: The Ronald Press, 1948. Pp. vii, 316. 84.00.
IN his new book, Mr. Gosnell, an old timer in the field of quantitative
analysis, treats two cornerstones of popular government, suffrage and repre-
sentation. He seeks to make "government, or some aspects of it," scientific.
In the implementation of this purpose, he is interested in evolving behavior
patterns from the attitudes of various groups who have benefited, and still
are benefiting, from suffrage extension. Because of this purpose, he attempts
to correlate with certain social and psychological data the attitudes of repre-
sentatives and voters, as well as the chances for success of different systems
of representation.
Hand in hand with this "scientific" endeavor-some times explicitly, more
often implicitly-appears the premise on which the author rests his advocacy
of democracy: the belief that in the long run democracy not only gives the
voter an opportunity for intelligent choice, but also provides for peaceful
change of any given set of social institutions. He admits that the goals of
democracy are never reached by an automatic reliance on the working of
the democratic process. Time and again-especially in his initial chapters
on suffrage as well as in his conclusion-the author stresses the fact that
effective suffrage presupposes a long and arduous term in the school of polit-
ical education and that suffrage is only the "threshold," not the ultimate
realization of democracy.
At times it seems that the author is somewhat less sure of the validity of
his own premise. There are blockhead politicians who, with evil devices
such as gerrymandering, deflect the popular will. There are also antiquated
t Member, Tennessee Bar Association (Pres. 1936); Member, American Bar Asrodation
(Pres. 1941-2); Member, Association of the Bar of the City of New York; Honorary Member,
Canadian Bar Association.
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institutions such as the "jungle ballot," which, by expecting the impossible of
the voter, lead to the discrediting of the whole system. Mr. Gosnell expects
these imperfections may be overcome; he occasionally doubts, however, that
judgments by voters even fully educated in responsible citizenship achieve
the democratic goal
With his optimism tempered by these doubts, Mr. Gosnell has found it
wiser to throw overboard the traditional theories of representation sponsored
not only by Hobbes, whom he quotes disparagingly, but also by Spinoza,
Rousseau and the minor luminaries of nineteenth and twentieth century
political philosophy. Thus, in effect, he shifts the focus of interest from repre-
sentation as a unifying force to a sceptical and extremely subjective defini-
tion of representation which concentrates on a psychological, and to some
degree sociological, relationship between voter and representative. Such a
psychological approach might be appropriate for an analysis of a system of
representation based upon a restricted, and therefore fairly homogenous,
electorate, such as prevailed in the early nineteenth century. While he is
given to analytical treatment of various concepts and interrelationships,1
Mr. Gosnell makes no attempt to determine the differences which distinguish
the United States middle class system of representation from the system of
a fully developed mass democracy. In the middle class'system of representa-
tion political parties, motivated solely by desire for victory at the polls,
exist cheek by jowl with a limited number of predominately social and eco-
nomic organizations, while in a mass deniocracy political and economic
groups blend. This omission is significant, because in a mass democracy
representative bodies have been more or less relegated to a back seat and the
representative quality, so to speak, has come to be vested in the parties,
rather than the assembly or the individual representatives.
In order to illustrate these crucial distinctions, let us examine in somewhat
greater detail the chapter of the book which deals with the occupations of
representatives. The author dwells on two facets of the problem: the meas-
ure and significance of the identity of occupation between constituent and
legislator, and the meaning of "the over-representation of lawyers" in legis-
latures.
As to identity of occupation, the author reaches the conclusion that the
demand for identity seems to coincide with extremism-a thesis which he
seeks to prove by a number of examples from recent legislative reports. But
has professional identity any real meaning in present day society? While it
is clear that a representative tries for propaganda purposes to bestow on him-
self a profession which will in some degree identify him with the rank and
file of his constituents, yet in mass democracies this identity has become a
pure fiction. At present, to an increasing degree, people are elected to the
1. The book contains an interesting and exhaustive discussion of the origins of repre-
sentation. No attempt is made, however, to sketch the evolution and transformation of
this institution and to define its present role.
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legislature because of their professional affiliation with the party itself or
with certain groups, such as trade unionis, etc., with which the party is closely
associated. 2
In striking contrast to the habits and opinions of the nineteenth century,
in all European parliaments since World War I the ascendancy of the profes-
sional political organizer, together with the professional representatives of
interest groups, has been an acknowledged fact. Characteristically enough,
when difficulties arise in our period, they come from the survival of independ-
ent members in the representative bodies, who are not connected with or-
ganizations. 3 Investigation of the problems of professional stratification can
therefore be significant only upon inquiry as to the kinds of interests repre-
sented in the legislature-a question which bears little relation to the de-
scription which the individual representative may wish to give in the official
year book as to his professional status.
As to the United States in contrast to Europe, account must be taken of
the predomination of the lawyer-representative. The author gives greater
weight to the lawyer's "occupational influences in solving primary group
conflicts" than to middle class control of American politics. The lawyer in
America may, however, be compared to the medieval cleric. It is suggested
that professional training made them both most eligible for public office.
But professional background does not, in fact, give much indication as to
what ultimate role lawyers are destined to have within the political frame-
work. This depends to some extent on skill and inclination, but probably
still more on the individual and the group ties which make it possible for a
lawyer to run for office and to maintain himself in office. While election
expenses remain as high as they are-except for the independently wealthy
who can afford to run for pleasure and for glory-many people who seek
public office cannot bear the financial burden alone. Any arrangement in
solution of this problem may be of a strictly personal nature, but it may also
involve closer ties with some local or national interest group. It is suggested
that such ties might often be a more significant explanation of the representa-
tive's behavior than the most refined tabkeau psyclwlogilue of the representa-
tive-voter relation.
The American lawyer's survival as the dominant legislative type is the
2. The author cites the German Economic Party, with its preponderance of bakers,
innkeepers and house owners as a "clear and concise case in point" for the electorate's in-
clination toward standards of professional identity. This party was, however, a flare-up
of independent middle class resistance against big business and the working clas. At the
height of its power, in 1928, it received only 4.5% of the vote and thus constitutes a rather
unrepresentative exception to the rule here described. P. 222 n.4.
3. Thus, for example, after the 1945 British elections, a number of ex-service men
without any professional affiliation with the party machines or with special interest groups
found themselves in financial difficulties, because after entering Parliament they were vith.
out any regular outside income. See the New Statesman and the Nation,January 26,1947.
Some of them who tried to make a living by using their confidential parliamentary informa-
tion were censured for breach of privilege, and one was even ousted from Parliament. See
The Times (London), October 30, 1947, p. 3, col. 2, and October 31, 1947, p. 4, col. 6.
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outcome of a specific socio-political constellation and is not, as the author
seeks to imply by assigning him an umpire's role in solving primary group
conflicts, necessarily concomitant with the survival of his individual inde-
pendence. Investigation on this point, neglected probably because of the
difficulties attendant thereon, might be rewarding.
Similar criticism may be made of the author's discussion of initiative and
referendum. Here too a distinction must be made. Strongly organized polit-
ical parties have a tendency to "mediatise" this institution and to use it as
one line of strategy in a concerted plan of political action. This tactic has
been demonstrated in Weimar Germany and recently in the Swiss Confedera-
tion (as distinct from the individual cantons and communities). In the
United States initiative and referendum statutes--except where a referen-
dum is made necessary by the rigidities of constitutional provisions-have
remained a subordinate instrument in the hands of special interest groups
who want to bring a point before the public for decision, subject to possible
modification by the courts or assemblies, and later reconsideration by the
people. This diffuse character of American legislation on initiative and refer-
endum, which deprives it of any long range political effect, makes the answer
to the traditional question of whether these statutes have a progressive or a
conservative character relatively irrelevant.
In view of the differences between the American type of representative
institutions and mass democracy, the reviewer tends to come to the conclu-
sion that the author's aptly coined phrase of suffrage as the threshold, not
the throne, of democracy may have a more profound significance than the
author himself would admit. As long as there are legal inequalities and tech-
nical limitations upon the full expression of popular will-as long as there is
only a moderate degree of popular participation in the electoral processes,
the halcyon days of the representative system will last. The real problem of
representative democracy arises only when democracy has become fully rep-
resentative, with all groups in the community able to throw their weight
around. The author assumes that, once democracy in the formal sense has
been established, it is the framework within which social conflicts are peace-
fully solved and power peacefully transmitted. But to the reviewer it seems
that the full representation of groups now under-represented might bring
into the open all the possibilities for conflict deriving from fundamental
societal antagonisms, and thus jeopardize the author's thesis. The United
States is now on its way from a middle class representative system to a full
fledged mass democracy and is slowly coming to the point at which legal in-
equalities are giving way, at which underprivileged groups are becoming con-
versant with the mysteries of the .ballot box, and at which political parties
motivated solely by desire for election success and using patronage accord-
ingly are transforming themselves into more rigid political factors. Shall~we
be cynical and say that it may not happen in our lifetime, or shall we be brave
and brace ourselves for the trials which it will inevitably bring?
OTTO KIRCHHEIMER t
t State Department, Washington, D. C.
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